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While the ongoing pandemic a!ects all European economies, we show that it 
is likely to cause much more economic damage in some member states than 
in others. Early "scal crisis responses by EU governments do not re#ect these 
di!erences. If anything, countries which are likely to be especially vulnerable 
are currently committing fewer "scal resources to "ghting the economic fall-
out than others. A joint European policy response to share the "scal burden 
of this crisis is, therefore, urgently needed.
1  We thank Frank Eich for his helpful input and comments. 
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Executive summary
The Covid-19 crisis will bring massive economic costs for all countries in the Eu-
ropean Union. This policy paper analyses to what extent these costs are likely to 
di#er across member states and how governments are trying to mitigate them. 
This initial analysis suggests two important takeaways. 
First, economic vulnerabilities di#er substantially across member states. The 
pandemic hit European countries at very di#erent points in their economic cycles. 
The potential economic damage of lockdowns and other public health measures, 
what‘s more, varies according to member states’ sectoral composition and busi-
ness demography. Unfortunately, there are countries such as Italy, Spain, Portu-
gal and to some extent France that combine weak pre-crisis fundamentals with a 
range of factors (e.g. strong dependency on especially exposed sectors) that make 
their economies particularly vulnerable in the current economic freeze. If these 
countries do not take bold counter-measures, the economic fallout is likely to be 
especially devastating.
Second, initial $scal crisis responses, so far, do not seem to match the distribution of 
economic risks. Even though Germany, for example, is in a relatively benign position 
in terms of structural vulnerability to the crisis, its $scal policy response has been 
much more forceful than measures taken early on in Italy or Spain. Comparing res-
ponses across EU countries reveals that this is a general pattern. So far, if anything, 
countries likely to be especially vulnerable to the economic repercussions of Covid-19 
have committed fewer $scal resources to $ghting the fallout than others. 
If this pattern persists, some European countries are bound to exit this crisis much 
stronger than others. To avoid even greater economic disparities amongst mem-
ber states and ensure a swift recovery once the public health measures can be 
safely lifted, $scal responses will require to be more substantial in some regions. 
While we can only speculate about why this is not already happening, one likely 
explanation is that countries with high legacy debt-to-GDP-ratios and low growth 
potential might rightly be wary of the $scal burden implied by stronger policy 
measures. Therefore, a joint European policy response that shares the $scal bur-
den of this crisis is urgently required.
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Introduction
By now, all countries in the European Union are su#ering the economic repercussions 
of the ongoing public health crisis. As member states shut down large parts of their 
civil and business life to contain the spread of the virus, they have also put in train 
$scal policies to fund public health measures and mitigate the economic damage of 
the seizure in much economic activity. This policy paper discusses these early $scal 
responses. It shows that the scale and scope of the measures taken so far di#er mark-
edly across countries. At the same time, these initial di#erences do not seem to re-
%ect country-level divergences in the likely costs caused by the economic shutdown. 
To avoid even greater economic disparities across Europe and secure a quick recovery, 
$scal measures, therefore, will have to be more substantial in several regions. To en-
sure that all member states are able to achieve this, a joint European policy response 
that shares the $scal costs of this crisis is necessary.2 
1 Same Shock – Di$erent Vulnerabilities
Before going into the details of $scal crisis responses across the EU, we examine 
the extent to which member states’ exposure to the economic consequences of 
the ongoing health crisis di#ers. Using some early proxies of economic vulnerabil-
ities suggests substantial di#erences in costs across member states and magni$ed 
exposure in some countries with already weak pre-crisis economic fundamentals. 
No EU member state will be able to escape the economic consequences of the Cov-
Y)ɍʪʳYYȮð{«-ª-ȯV-YYYmYj-m±{9-Ù{-t{tY-ª-±)Y9--tm±7{
at least two reasons. First, it visits them in very di#erent economic contexts. In some 
European countries, such as the Netherlands, the crisis follows years of relatively sta-
ble economic growth. In others, such as Germany, it hits home at the beginning of a 
downturn that’s already been priced in. Yet more countries, such as Italy or France, 
are facing the Corona crisis in the midst of a prolonged period of economic weakness. 
 
Second, the economic costs of shutdowns di#er across sectors, $rms and occupa-
tions. While the exact e#ects are hard to estimate in advance and will depend on 
a range of contextual aspects, we can identify a number of factors that are likely 
to increase these economic costs and those of other public health measures. At 
sectoral level, a high dependence on certain service sectors related to social con-
sumption, leisure, tourism/hospitality and transport will almost certainly increase 
shutdown costs as these sectors are not only most directly a#ected by social dis-
tancing but also unlikely to experience enough delayed consumption and pent-up 
demand post-crisis to o#set current losses. While manufacturers are also a#ected, 
especially if they rely on labour-intensive production that may be hit by public 
health policies such as self-isolation or travel restrictions, a V- or tick-shaped recov-
ery is much more likely in these areas and will help the recovery. 
Estimating economic vulnerability at the occupational level is more di'cult. As a 
possible proxy, Dingel and Neimann (2020) have analysed what kind of profession-
al tasks in the US could also be done from home. Whereas some jobs rely on direct 
personal interactions or machine use, a lot of occupations, especially administra-
2 For a proposal on how such a one-off response could look like, see Grund, Guttenberg and 
Odendahl (2020). 
“The economic costs 
of shutdowns differ 
across sectors, firms 
and occupations.”
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tive tasks and high-skilled jobs in the knowledge economy, can also be done in 
isolation and are, therefore, potentially less a#ected by the current shock. This, of 
{-ȯ-sYttYs-7-{°±{7YY-°{-ȮğtV-{t-Vt)ȯt)sYt-
istrative worker whose employer goes bankrupt will become unemployed even 
though his/her job could, in theory, be done from home. Also, the ability to work 
from home depends on other factors such as regional broadband infrastructure. 
Therefore, home-o'ce could be di'cult in some regions even for jobs that are, in 
V-{±ȯ-m-«{jm-Ȯð{«-ª-ȯ-ª-±VYtJ-m--YtJ-mȯ«-t-V-V-
of non-teleworkable jobs in total employment to approximate another dimension 
of crisis vulnerability. 
Finally, business demography is likely 
to play a role, too. Experience from re-
cent crises shows that, for small com-
panies, which often have lower capital 
reserves, stronger credit constraints 
and are more sensitive to weak con-
sumer demand, a temporary shutdown 
can turn into liquidity and solvency 
issues with striking rapidity.3 Against 
this background, countries may well 
be more exposed to the current crisis 
if large parts of their economies are 
made up by small businesses.4
While we still lack data on the direct 
economic e#ects of the crisis, we can 
use these factors to map some rough 
estimates of the di#erences in exposure 
across member states. As a measure for 
the level of pre-crisis economic di'cul-
ties, Figure 1 plots member states’ un-
employment rates in 2019 on the x-axis. 
To indicate how severely lockdowns af-
fect national economies, it shows dif-
ferent dimensions of vulnerabilities on 
the y-axis. The upper panel depicts the 
share of total national jobs located in 
highly vulnerable sectors compromis-
ing accommodation and food services, 
transport and other personal services.  The middle panel illustrates vulnerabilities 
that stem from the share of non-teleworkable jobs in the overall economy, esti-
mated from micro-level EU-SILC data, and the lower one shows the proportion of 
workers employed in small companies (<50 employees) within total employment.5 
This $gure should, of course, be regarded with a pinch of salt given that it only 
3 See here. 
4 Research shows that small businesses were hit especially hard during the Great Financial 
Crisis (Sahin et al. 2011). 
5 Data for unemployment, sectors and business demography is drawn from Eurostat (2020). 
The share of non-teleworkable jobs is computed following a categorization provided by Nei-
stʈÕYtJ-mɮˈ˅ˈ˅ɯ7{ g{V-óĶÏğˊɍ)YJY m-ª-mȮļ-m-«{jm-g{Ytm)-mmj
that could, in theory, be done from home regardless of sector and may well somewhat over-
estimate the number of occupations for which home-office is an option. 
Figure 1: Economic vulnerabilities to the 
crisis across member states
“Experience shows 
that, for small com-
panies, a temporary 
shutdown can turn 
into liquidity and 
solvency issues espe-
cially quickly.”
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captures speci$c aspects when it comes to exposure to the crisis. Nonetheless, it 
depicts some important patterns. While the distribution of countries depends on 
the vulnerability measures employed, there are several countries such as Germa-
ny, Austria and Sweden, which combine low pre-crisis unemployment rates with 
relatively low scores in terms of other crisis vulnerabilities and are, therefore, like-
ly to weather the economic e#ects of the pandemic relatively well. By contrast, 
some EU countries, including Italy, Spain, Portugal and to a certain extent France, 
consistently end up in the upper-right corner of the distribution. These countries 
combine relatively high pre-crisis unemployment with a signi$cant dependence 
on high-risk sectors, non-teleworkable jobs and small companies and, therefore, 
seem especially exposed to the negative economic consequences of the public 
health measures now in force.
2 Same Crisis – Di$erent Fiscal Policy Responses 
While the exposure to the unfolding crisis di#ers across member states, most Eu-
ropean governments have already triggered $scal responses to mitigate the eco-
nomic fallout.  Before we go into the details of the speci$c programs of some of the 
bigger countries, we start by comparing measures across all member states. We 
show there is substantial variation in the scale and scope of initial responses but 
that this variation does not seem to square with crisis exposure. If anything, mem-
ber states with high levels of vulnerability are dedicating fewer $scal resources to 
%attening the recession curve than those with a more benign economic outlook. 
 
Figure 2: The size of early 'scal policy responses across member states
“Some countries 
combine relatively 
high pre-crisis un-
employment with 
a large economic 
dependence on 
high-risk sectors, 
non-teleworkable 
jobs and small com-
panies.”
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Figure 2 plots initial $scal crisis responses according to information from IMF 
(2020) for all EU countries where data is available. The upper panel shows the 
scale of public guarantees for private credits and other liquidity measures such 
as resources dedicated to tax and national insurance (or social security) contri-
bution deferrals, which generally aim at supporting domestic businesses via the 
temporary provision of ample cheap credit and (re)payment holidays. The lower 
panel depicts measures of direct non-credit-based $scal transfers. They include, 
for example, cash rescue funds for a#ected businesses, temporary tax cuts and 
additional spending for new labour market measures such as short-term work 
programmes and extended welfare state schemes.
When interpreting these numbers, we 
should keep in mind that for some meas-
ures it remains di'cult to estimate a 
price tag upfront as, for example, the 
$nal costs of credit schemes or short-
term working programmes will depend 
on uptake. Moreover, when it comes to 
liquidity support, countries di#er when 
it comes to how private leverage is tar-
geted via government cash. Nonethe-
less, observable di#erences in this initial 
data will matter down the road. 
The variation in initial responses is 
stark. Considering the headline $gures, 
Germany constitutes a clear outlier. The 
ambition of its national programme, 
which has been hailed by a broad co-
alition of German economic experts,6 
remains unrivalled so far. The govern-
ment has announced an unlimited 
amount of liquidity support through 
public guarantees for private loans 
and also introduced the largest (so far) 
amount of cash transfers (4.5% GDP). It-
aly has recently substantially increased 
its liquidity programme but, like France, 
remains much more modest when it 
comes to direct transfers. Finally, there 
is a range of EU member states such as Spain and Portugal, in which spending for 
both liquidity support and cash payments remains below average. 
Crucially, the di#erences in initial $scal responses do not seem to re%ect those 
in exposure to the economic consequences of the crisis. Figure 3 plots total di-
rect transfers (excluding guarantees and deferrals) against our di#erent measures 
of member states’ economic exposure towards the public health policies now in 
place. It shows no consistent pattern. If anything, there is a negative relationship 
between initial $scal responses and exposure to the crisis, especially when meas-
ured via the proportion of non-teleworkable jobs in total employment or econom-
6 e.g. Baldwin, R. & Weder di Mauro, B. (2020). Mitigating the COVID Economic Crisis: Act 
Fast And Do Whatever It Takes. CEPR Press, London. 
Figure 3: Economic vulnerabilities and 
early 'scal policy responses
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ic dependence on small companies. Countries that are especially exposed to the 
negative e#ects of social distancing, at least as of now, thus do not seem to ded-
icate more or even equivalent $scal resources to mitigate the economic e#ects of 
the crisis than those in a better position in terms of sectoral composition. 
3 Di$erences in Fiscal Responses in  
Big Member States 
A comparison of initial responses to the crisis across all member states shows 
that the scope of the measures taken so far di#ers markedly country-by-country. 
Moreover, these di#erences do not correlate with early measures of economic vul-
nerabilities. To enable a better understanding of how exactly individual programs 
di#er, we discuss policy variations for Germany, France, Italy, and Spain in Table 1. 
For comparison, we also include the UK as a large former member state with an 
independent central bank. Comparing the programs shows that these $ve mem-
- -ȯ {t V- 7-ȯ - Ysm-s-tYtJ YsYm jYt){7{mYY-Ȯð{«-ª-ȯ
the resources committed to such policies di#er substantially. If these di#erences 
remain in place, some member states are likely to emerge from the crisis much 
stronger than others. 
 
When it comes to liquidity support, the programs in all $ve countries largely pursue 
similar goals. All have set up sizeable public credit guarantee schemes which target 
micro- enterprises and SMEs and guarantee between 70% and 90% of  total bor-
rowing. Notably, Germany and Italy remain as of now the only countries that have 
-mYV-)ʪʩʩʦ-)YJt--7{ĶĘÙȮð{«-ª-ȯJYª-tVV-Ù{-t
Commission only recently changed its state aid rules to allow for complete guar-
antees, other member states may follow soon. Additionally, liquidity is expanded 
through tax and payment deferrals.7 Germany and France have postponed income 
and corporate taxes for all companies and self-employed persons a#ected by the 
crisis for a longer period, at least until the end of 2020. The UK has deferred all VAT 
payments until as late as March 2021. In Italy and Spain, tax deferrals are limited to 
SMEs and will end, respectively, in June and no later than September 2020.
 
So, while the liquidity programs of the $ve go in a similar direction, the resources 
behind them di#er dramatically. Germany so far remains the only country that 
has announced unlimited liquidity guarantees. Italy has just recently expanded 
the limits and now guarantees up to €750bn (43% GDP) in total lending to private 
companies. Currently, guarantees in France and the UK remain more limited, be-
ing capped at about €300bn (approximately 15% of GDP). As one of the member 
states which so far has been hardest hit, Spain has the smallest guarantee pro-
gram with about 8% of GDP.
When comparing these numbers, it is important to remember that they provide hy-
pothetical outcomes. In the end, $scal costs will largely depend on uptake and crisis 
development. Furthermore, some countries may announce future measures while 
public guarantees and tax deferrals are not the only way to increase liquidity. Italy, 
Spain and the UK are also seeking to expand credit supply through incentivizing 
7 See here. 
“Countries that are 
especially exposed to 
the negative effects 
of social distancing, 
at least currently, 
commit fewer fiscal 
resources to mitigate 
the economic effects 
of the crisis than 
others.”
“While the liquidity 
programs of mem-
ber states go into 
a similar direction, 
the resources that 
back them up differ 
dramatically across 
countries.”
6/13
banks to provide more loans, though these come without public guarantees.8ð{«-
ever, so far, big European members have made available very di#erent amounts of 
public money to guarantee credit supply during the crisis. Depending on how the 
crisis evolves, this might mean that liquidity costs in some countries are bound to 
increase or else threaten severe credit crunches for a#ected companies. 
Credit-based liquidity measures are important stabilizers but also accelerate pri-
vate debt afterwards and may result in severely weakened balance sheets or even 
a wave of bankruptcies down the road. All big member states, therefore, have 
started to implement complementary measures that directly channel non-credit 
based transfers to those a#ected by the crisis. Again, these policies, on the surface, 
look quite similar across countries but di#er markedly in their generosity. 
All $ve countries have introduced some form of short-term work program in which 
public money is used to pay workers on reduced hours some of the income they 
lose. Current programs not only di#er in the proportion of lost wages they cover 
(between 60% of net income in Germany and 84% in France). Large di#erences 
in de facto generosity also exist due to caps on overall payments. In Germany, for 
example, the upper limit for the total payable amount is set at about €2,900 per 
month and in France short-term work programs can pay out as much as €6,850 per 
month (450% of the national minimum wage). The Italian program, on the other 
hand, is capped at a monthly maximum of €1,200 and thus remains below what 
was discussed as a potential minimum wage there last year.  
In most cases, businesses with short-term work programs also receive reliefs in 
tax and social security contributionsȮğV- VtVȯ °-jȯ { 7ȯm±
minor role in the crisis measures of most countries. France has announced some 
individual tax reliefs for highly a#ected businesses but the details of the program 
have not yet been published. While Italy provides some tax credit on rental costs 
for businesses in lockdown, the UK, so far, remains the only member state that has 
announced a somewhat larger program consisting of a refund of business rates for 
all companies in retail, hospitality and leisure. 
The starkest di#erences in the $scal programs emerge with regard to the scope 
of direct emergency cash funds for a#ected companies and the self-employed. 
These programs, which inject non-repayable cash into a#ected sectors, are espe-
cially important in mitigating the long-term negative e#ects by limiting bankrupt-
cies among viable SMEs as a result of the shutdowns. Whereas most big member 
states have established some form of emergency payment, the size of transfers 
di#ers markedly. In Germany, micro- companies and the self-employed can re-
ceive between €9,000 and €15,000 depending on their size. The UK supports its 
$rms, especially in the retail, hospitality and leisure sector, with similar amounts. 
In France, on the other hand, cash transfers only exist for micro-enterprises and 
cover €3,500 at the maximum, whereas in Italy they only add up to a couple of 
hundred Euros or at most €1,500 for self-employed and non-salaried workers in 
severely a#ected sectors with no additional grants for businesses. In Spain, no siz-
8 In the UK, the Bank of England has reduced the countercyclical capital buffer from 1% to 
0%, thus releasing approximately £180bn additional liquidity into the economy. Italy and 
Spain have said they will leverage public measures to expand private liquidity supply from 
the banking sector. In Italy €5bn is designed to unlock €350bn of overall liquidity, in Spain 
ʵˆ˅˅tYtmYJt--V{m)m-){ʵˈ˅˅t{mmYY)Y±Ȯð{«-ª-ȯV-)-Ym{7
how this leverage is to be achieved remain unclear in both countries so far. 
“The starkest differ-
ences in the fiscal 
programs across  
big member states 
exist with regard to 
the scope of direct 
emergency cash 
funds for affected 
companies and the 
self-employed.”
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able program for direct cash injection exists. Given the particularly strong reliance 
on small enterprises in Spain and Italy, this North-South divide in initial emergen-
cy transfers could result in substantial asymmetries in the recovery period. 
Germany France Italy Spain United Kingdom
CREDIT GUARANTEES AND LIQUIDITY
Short-term 100% 
credit guarantees for 
SMEs (>10 and <250 
employees) with a 
maximum volume of 
€800,000
90% credit guarantees 
for companies with 
up to 50mn turnover 
(<250 employees)
80% credit guarantees 
for companies with 
>50mn (>249 employ-
ees)
 
Public Resources for 
Guarantees
€600bn fund for com-
panies with at least 
250 employees
Unlimited guaranteed 
liquidity through the 
KfW for SMEs
Other Liquidity  
Measures
€2bn for co-invest-
ment in start-ups 
through the KfW
70%-90% credit guar-
antees for following 
credits:
ɜ Direct state guaran-
tees on commercial 
loans and credit 
lines,  for enterpris-
es with up to 5,000 
employees
ɜ State guarantees to 
banks on portfolios 
of new loans for all 
types of companies
Public Resources for 
Guarantees
Public guarantees of 
up to €300bn (13% of 
GDP)
Other Liquidity  
Measures
€4bn fund to support 
the cash %ow of start-
ups
Activation of pub-
lic reinsurance on 
outstanding credit 
insurance up to €10bn
100% credit guaran-
tees for companies 
with up to 499 
employees and a 
maximum volume of 
€800,000
90% credit guaran-
tees up to a volume of 
€5mn
Public Resources for 
Guarantees
Total guarantee 
volume up to €750bn 
(43% of GDP)
State guarantees of 
€0.5bn to the state 
development bank
Extension of the SME 
Guarantee Fund: from 
€40bn up to €100bn 
for guaranteed 
funding 
Other Liquidity  
Measures
Liquidity of up to 
€10bn for new loans 
to medium-large 
$rms.
80% credit  guaran-
tees for SMEs and 
self-employed
70% guarantees 
for new loans, 60% 
guarantees for loan 
renewals for all other 
companies
Public Resources for 
Guarantees
Mobilisation of 
€200bn liquidity, of 
which €100bn for 
guarantees (8% of 
GDP) and the rest will 
be based on private 
sources
€2bn liquidity guaran-
tees for exporters
Other Liquidity  
Measures
ļV-óÏğYmm{«-){
increase its funding 
by €10bn to extend its 
existing credit lines
80% credit guarantees 
for SMEs with a turno-
ver of up to £45mn
Public Resources for 
Guarantees
Limit of £330bn for 
state guarantee loans 
(15% of GDP)
£1bn to support lend-
ing to SMEs through 
the Business Interrup-
tion Loan Scheme
Other Liquidity  
Measures
The countercyclical 
capital bu#er rate was 
cut to 0%, which is 
expected to support 
the ability of banks 
to supply additional 
credits up to £190bn
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PAYMENT DEFERRALS
Deferral of income 
and corporate taxes 
for businesses and 
self-employed a#ect-
ed by the crisis until 
the end of 2020
Missed rent payments 
due to Corona cannot 
lead to evictions and 
may be postponed 
and fully paid until  
June 30th 2022.
Deferral of social 
security contribu-
tions and corporate/
personal income tax 
payments for $rms 
and entrepreneurs
Extension of the 
seasonal suspension 
of evictions from 
dwellings
Water, gas or electric-
ity bills and rents will 
be postponed for the 
time of the crisis for 
VSEs  and SMEs.
Supposed to inject 
liquidity of  of €32bn
Deferral of all direct 
taxes, indirect taxes, 
contributions for 
businesses and 
self-employed with 
turnover below €2mn 
until June
Suspension of loan 
repayment by SMEs 
until end of Septem-
ber
Tax controls, coercive 
collection, etc. sus-
pended (value around 
€0.6bn)
Suspension of the 
payment of electricity, 
gas, water and waste 
bills in the most af-
fected municipalities 
until May
one-year suspension 
of real estate mort-
gage payments for 
workers having lost 
their jobs (costs about 
€400mn)
Supposed to unlock 
liquidity of €16.4bn
Tax payment deferrals 
for SMEs and self-em-
ployed for 6 months 
(value of €14bn)
Temporary suspension 
of evictions
ğt-ɍs{tVmorato-
rium on mortgage 
payments for a#ected 
workers 
Special regime for the 
suspension of public 
contracts, foreseeing 
compensation in 
certain cases
VAT payments can be 
deferred until March 
2021 (costs about 
£30bn)
Suspension of new 
evictions from social 
or private rented 
accommodation
Temporary suspension 
of mortgage pay-
ments
Individuals who 
are due to pay their 
personal income tax 
under ‚Self-Assess-
ment‘ have the right 
to defer the payment 
until January 2021
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SHORT-TERM WORK PROGRAMS AND EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE
Short-time work pro-
gram covering 60% 
(67% for employees 
with children) of net 
earnings 
ɜ Maximum monthly 
payout: €2,900
ɜ Applies to com-
panies in which 
at least 10% of 
employees reduce 
hours
ɜ Social security 
payments fully 
refunded for lost 
work hours
Other Labor Market & 
Welfare Measures
Easier access to social 
bene'ts for 6 months
Estimated costs
Total costs not esti-
mated yet
Short-time work pro-
gram covering 84% of 
net earnings
ɜ Maximum monthly 
payment: €6850 
(450% of minimum 
wage)
ɜ 100% coverage for 
workers with mini-
mum wage
Other Labor Market & 
Welfare Measures
Temporary agency 
workers will be paid 
for the entire duration 
of their assignment as 
initially foreseen 
Increased sick leave 
payment for a#ected 
workers
Estimated costs
ğª-mm{{7
€8.5bn
Short-time work pro-
gram covering 80% of 
gross earnings
ɜ If salary < €2160, 
maximum monthly 
payments €998
ɜ If salary > €2160, 
maximum monthly 
payment €1200
ɜ All companies  
Other Labor Market & 
Welfare Measures
Raise of paid leave by 
12 days for disabled 
workers and workers 
caring for a disabled 
relative 
Estimated costs
ğª-mm{{7
€10.3bn
Short-time work pro-
gram covering 70% of 
net earnings
ɜ Maximum monthly 
payment: €2310 
ɜ Minimum monthly 
payment: €787
ɜ Social security pay-
ments not refunded
Other Labor Market & 
Welfare Measures
Increased sick pay for 
infected workers or 
those quarantined, to 
75% of the regulatory 
base, paid by the so-
cial security budget
Temporary contracts 
can not be cancelled
Temporary employ-
ment adjustment 
schemes have been 
signi$cantly simpli-
$ed
Estimated costs
Total costs not esti-
mated yet
Short-time work pro-
gram covering 80% of 
gross earnings
ɜ Maximum monthly 
payment:  £2500
ɜ So far limited for 3 
months
Other Labor Market & 
Welfare Measures
Statutory sick pay for 
self-quarantined peo-
ple from the $rst day 
and refund of these 
cost of up to 2 weeks 
for small businesses 
with less than 250 
employees
Estimated costs
ğª-mm{{7£6.2bn
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EMERGENCY CASH PAYMENTS
Direct cash payments 
for VSEs and self-em-
ployed for three 
months
ɜ Businesses up to 5 
full-time employ-
ees: €9,000
ɜ Business up to 10 
full-time employ-
ees: €15,000
Estimated Costs
Total costs around 
€50bn
Direct cash payments 
for micro-companies  
and self-employed 
ɜ Firms with annual 
turnover <€1mn: 
€1,500
ɜ Firms with at least 
one employee: 
additional pay-
ment of €2,000 if 
threatened with 
bankruptcy
Estimated Costs
Overall €2bn for sup-
porting micro-com-
panies in March and 
April
Direct cash payments 
for workers and 
self-employed
ɜ Low-income work-
ers who continue 
working: €100
ɜ Self-employed in 
the municipalities 
most affected: €500 
per month up to 3 
months
ɜ Self-employed and 
seasonal workers in 
affected industries: 
€600
Estimated Costs
Total costs at least 
€3.9bn
Extraordinary allow-
ance for self- em-
ployed
ɜ Self-employed 
workers affected: 
allowance about 
70% of social secu-
rity contributions at 
least for one month
Estimated Costs
Not yet estimated
Direct cash payments 
for SMEs and self-em-
ployed 
ɜ Self-employed with 
average profits 
below £50,000: 
taxable grant of up 
to 80% of their pre-
vious earnings over 
the last three years 
will be paid capped 
at £2,500 
ɜ Small businesses: 
up to £3,000
ɜ Companies with 
properties used 
for retail, hospital-
ity or leisure: up to 
£25000
Estimated Costs
Total costs at least 
£6.2bn
TAX CUTS
Individual tax reliefs 
for very a#ected 
companies
60% tax credit on 
property rental costs 
for companies with 
temporary closures for 
March (costs around 
€540mn)
Exemption of employ-
er’s social security 
contributions to $rms 
a#ected by temporary 
employment schemes 
up to 100% for SMEs, 
and 75% for other 
companies
50% exemption from 
employer’s social 
security contributions 
from February to 
June for workers with 
permanent discontin-
uous contracts in the 
tourism sector and 
related activities
100% relief of busi-
ness rates on property 
for all properties used 
in retail, hospitality or 
leisure
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HEALTH
€1.15bn for protective 
equipment, equip-
ment for intensive 
care and research on 
vaccines
Additional €2.8bn to 
balance losses and to 
increase capacity
€260mn for hospi-
tals out of unspent 
reserves from 2019
€0.5bn of additional 
funds for the pur-
chase of equipment 
and other health 
expenses
additional emergency 
fund of €50mn for 
research on Covid-19
€3.2bn for additional 
healthcare spending 
and to support civil 
protection
€2.8bn to the regions 
to meet increased 
healthcare needs
€1bn for the Ministry 
{7ð-mV{{ª-
expenditures related 
to healthcare needs
€110mn as R&D 
expenditures for 
the development of 
drugs and vaccines for 
ÏğŌóÕɍʪʳ
£5bn for the National 
ð-mVĶ-ªY-
Conclusion
Initial $scal responses to economic challenges of the Covid-19 crisis have dif-
fered substantially across Europe. Crucially, at the macro level, these di#erences 
do not seem to re%ect di#erences in exposure to the economic costs of lock-
downs and social distancing measures. If anything, countries that are especially 
exposed to the economic consequences of the crisis, such as Italy and Spain, are 
so far doing less to mitigate its economic repercussions than member states in 
a more benign position. 
Moreover, comparing the programs of some of the bigger member states in 
more detail shows that these di#erences do not stem from divergent policy re-
sponses. Rather, member states are pursuing similar kinds of policies but, so 
far, have proven unable to devote similar amounts of resources to them. This 
could, of course, change in the course of the coming weeks and months but 
even these initial di#erences are likely to have an e#ect. In many cases, imme-
diate responses are vital to ensure the here-and-now survival of businesses and 
jobs, which will be di'cult to resuscitate once they are gone. Time is, therefore, 
of the essence. 
At this point, we can only speculate about why $scal resources spent on crisis 
mitigation di#er so dramatically across countries. Given that the ECB currently 
ensures favorable re-$nancing conditions for Eurozone countries through its 
PEPP program and that the European Commission has suspended EU $scal rules, 
t{s-s--7--7t)YtJ{tYtȮð{«-ª-ȯ{tY-m-)±
dealing with high legacy debt-to-GDP ratios may rightly be wary of the huge 
increase in public debt and potential questions about their debt sustainability 
that an appropriate $scal crisis response would imply (Baldwin and Weder di 
Mauro 2020). This could explain why $scal responses, so far, have remained 
more timid in particularly exposed and highly indebted countries such as Spain 
and Italy. 
Nevertheless, crisis measures need to converge swiftly or else risk aggravating 
economic disparities across member states as well as seriously harming the 
European recovery. To ensure such convergence regardless of individual mem-
“Nevertheless, crisis 
measures need to 
converge quickly or 
else risk aggravating 
economic dispari-
ties across member 
states and may seri-
ously harming Euro-
pean recovery.”
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ber states’ debt levels, growth potential and ability to fund it out of their own 
resources, a joint European policy response that provides for sharing the $scal 
costs of this crisis is urgently required.9 
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